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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to understand the role of market power on the loan risk and 
overall bank risk measures for Turkish banks during 2001-2009. Testing for this questi-
on is particularly important for the Turkish banking system, which experienced an inten-
se regulation process after 2000 leading to a significant decrease in the number of banks 
and thereby possibly reducing competition. The results of the study provide some eviden-
ce regarding the competition-stability hypothesis.
Keywords: competition, banking
1 Introduction
Given the high costs of banking crises in general and the role of competition in the 
recent U.S. subprime crisis, determining the reasons for banking system fragility and 
characterizing the role of competition in financial stability are important issues. Howe-
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ver, there is no theoretical and empirical consensus on the role of competition on stabi-
lity in banking.
There are two main hypotheses that are found in the literature about the relationship 
between competition and stability in banking: competition-fragility and competition-sta-
bility. The competition-fragility hypothesis argues that smaller banks, in more competitive 
environments, are more likely to take excessive risks and therefore competitive systems are 
more fragile than less competitive systems (see Keeley, 1990; Matutes and Vives, 2000; 
Caminal and Matutes, 2002; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2009 for further discussion). In 
contrast, the competition-stability hypothesis of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) suggests that 
less competitive banking environment may cause fragility. Because a less competitive ban-
king environments allow banks to increase the interest rate charged to firms (borrowers), 
which thus become more likely to have difficulties in repaying their loans, resulting in a 
higher probability of nonperforming loan ratios (NPL), more competitive environments 
are considered to be permit greater stability in banking systems (Beck, 2008)1.
Empirical studies consider the fragility issue from different points of views. Some stu-
dies consider bank fragility from a macro perspective and take into account systemic ban-
king crises (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; and Schaeck and Čihak, 2006). 
Other studies consider bank fragility from a micro or managerial perspective and define it 
as the failure of an individual bank (e.g. Fungacova and Weill, 2009; and Bordo, Redish 
and Rockoff, 1993). There are also studies that consider fragility to be related to the risk-
taking behavior of banks. These studies use the Z-index (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo, 2006; 
and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) or the NPL ratios to measure risk (Jimenez, 
Lopez and Saurina, 2008). Macro studies mainly provide evidence for the competition-
stability hypothesis while micro-based studies generally support the competition-fragili-
ty hypothesis. There is also no consensus about the methods for measuring competition. 
Some studies simply take the concentration ratios, while others use indices such as the 
Herfihndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Lerner, Tobin’s q, and Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) 
H-statistic. The empirical literature does not provide conclusive evidence in favor of eit-
her of the two hypotheses and the results of the individual studies are highly sensitive to 
the definition of fragility. 
The relationship between competition and stability in banking has been investigated 
in many studies for the U.S. and mostly other advanced economies. However, little rese-
arch has been carried out on this issue for developing economies, and previously there has 
been only one related study for Turkey: Tunay (2009). This is why our study is important. 
Tunay (2009) uses the NPL ratio as a measure of fragility and the three-bank concentra-
tion ratio, the ratio of privately owned bank assets to total assets of the system, and the 
ratio of foreign bank assets to total assets of the system as measures of competition for 
Turkish banking. Employing fixed and random effects models, he estimates the relation-
ship between competition and fragility for the years between 1988 and 2007. The findi-
ngs of Tunay (2009) indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
concentration and fragility. Moreover the existence of foreign banks was found to decre-
ase and domestic banks were found to increase fragility. The study provides some evi-
1 See Boyd and De Nicolo (2009) for further discussion. 
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dence in favor of the competition-stability hypothesis for Turkey. However, the measu-
rement of competition by concentration indices – as suggested by the structure conduct 
hypothesis in industrial organization literature – is a controversial issue. This is because 
competition and concentration refer to different concepts, and previous studies show that 
a concentrated banking system can be more competitive than a less concentrated one but 
also that a less concentrated banking system can be less competitive than a concentrated 
system (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; and Abbasoglu, Aysan and Gunes, 2007). 
The aim of this paper is to understand whether competition promotes stability or fra-
gility for Turkish banks. This question is particularly important for the Turkish banking 
system since it has experienced intensive regulation processes that have led to a decline 
in the number of banks and, possibly to changes in the competitive structure especially 
after the year 2000, an important turning point for Turkish banking. This paper employs 
mainly two different risk measures to account for loan risk and overall risk measures as 
dependent variables: the nonperforming loans to total loans and the Z-index to measure 
the risk taking behaviors of banks. Firstly, we employ the Lerner index and secondly the 
ratio of the difference between the total revenues and total cost to the total revenues (that 
does not specify any restriction on inputs and outputs) as proxies for the market power of 
individual banks during 2001-2009. To summarize, this paper contributes to the existing 
literature in different ways. Primarily, it is the first study to calculate the Lerner index for 
Turkish banks. Second, it is the first paper that considers competition as the ability to sell 
products above the marginal cost and then employs this to see the effect of competition 
on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in Turkey. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the methodology that 
is used to calculate the Lerner index, and the risk taking variables are introduced. Later, 
sample and data used in the study are presented along with the descriptive statistics. This 
is followed by a discussion of the empirical results, and the final section concludes the 
paper. 
2 Methodology
Many studies consider competition as a structural phenomenon and accordingly em-
ploy concentration ratios to measure competition. These studies argue that a greater con-
centration creates a less competitive banking environment that leads to higher profitabi-
lity (Fungacova and Weill, 2009). Accordingly, competition can be measured by con-
centration indices such as the market share of the largest banks or by the HHI, which is 
defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the largest banks (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2000). However, it should be kept in mind that concentration and competition do 
not refer to the same thing. 
Market power can be considered as the ability to sell products above the marginal 
cost. The Lerner index is one of the earliest and most popular indices for measuring market 
power as the difference between the price and marginal cost over the price (see Jimenez 
et al., 2008; Hainz et al., 2008; and Fungacova and Weill, 2009 for use of Lerner index in 
banking). The value of the index ranges from zero to one. In case of perfect competition, 
the price equals marginal cost and the value of the index becomes zero, and as the price 
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is determined above the marginal cost the value of the Lerner index increases. That is the 
more market power there is, the bigger is Lerner index.
In summary, we need two things to calculate the Lerner index: the price of bank pro-
duction and the marginal cost. In this study, the price of bank production is calculated as 
the total revenues over the total assets. The disadvantage of the Lerner index is that the 
marginal cost function needs to be estimated. In this paper, the information related to mar-
ginal cost is obtained from the total cost function2. 
A cost function specifies the relationship between cost, input prices and output level. 
However Berger and Humphrey (1997) state that there is no consensus on input and out-
put measures in banking. Nonetheless, there are two dominant approaches on this issue: 
the intermediation and production approaches. The production approach evaluates banks 
as production units that produce services to the depositors and borrowers. In this appro-
ach, the production factors such as land, labor and capital are used as inputs to produce 
banking services and the production is measured via the number of transactions or docu-
ments processed over a given time period. However, since this data is not easy to obtain 
the number of accounts have often been used as a proxy for banks’ production in the pre-
vious literature (Denizer et al., 2000; and Berger et al., 1997). The intermediation appro-
ach on the other hand, considers deposit banks as financial intermediaries that collect de-
posits from the depositors and lend to borrowers and assumes that banks collect deposits 
and other purchased funds with the assistance of labor and physical capital and as inter-
mediaries turn these sources of funds into loans (Kasman, 2002). 
However, Turkish deposit banks have not fulfilled their intermediation duty during 
the studied period and it is difficult to obtain data on the number of transactions; hence, 
the total loans are considered as outputs, while labor, physical capital, and borrowed funds 
are used as inputs. 
The price of labor represents the unit price of labor and it is obtained by dividing the 
personnel expenses (including severance payments) by the total assets. The price of physi-
cal capital is the ratio of other noninterest expenses (excluding personnel expenses and 
severance payments) to fixed assets. Finally, the price of funds represents the unit price 
of the funds and it is constructed as the ratio of interest expenses to borrowed funds and 
the deposit sum (Podpiera and Podpiera, 2005). 
Under the cost function specification, the total cost (the sum of personnel expenses, 
other noninterest expenses and interest expenses) is estimated as a function of the out-
put sum (total deposits, total securities, and total loans) and the three input prices. Table 
A1 gives the estimation results of the total cost function that is built in order to obtain the 
marginal cost. 
Calculating a Lerner index to be used as a proxy of market power is not an easy pro-
cess and can possibly be subject to many misspecification biases. Firstly, it requires many 
assumptions on inputs and outputs, and secondly, it requires many assumptions on the 
calculation methods of input prices and output quantity, and finally it requires assumpti-
2 See Christensen and Greene (1976), Ray (1982), Jimenez et al. (2008), Hainz et al. (2008), Carbo et al. (2009), 
and Fungacova and Weill (2009) for a detailed discussion of cost functions and application to the banking sector.
301
E. Yaldιz and F. Bazzana: The effect of market power on bank risk taking in Turkey
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (3) 297-314 (2010)
ons on the functional form of the cost function. Mountain and Thomas (1998) show that 
it is better to include no factor prices than to include miss-specified factor prices. Thus, in 
order to calculate the market power of the individual banks in Turkey, we use an MP ratio 
that does not specify any inputs and outputs, as well as a functional form that is simply of 
the difference between the total revenues and total cost to the total revenues. 
Since, the aim of this paper is to understand whether competition leads to taking hi-
gher risks or not, the general empirical model for this question is:
Risk taking of banks = f(market power, control variables).
In order to measure the risk taking behaviors of banks, nonperforming loans, and 
Z-index are employed. The Z-index can be computed as Z = (NPA+EA) /σ(NPA), where 
NPA is the net profit to the assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio and σ(NPA) is the stan-
dard deviation of the Net Profits to the Assets. The Z-index goes up as the profitabili-
ty and capitalization increase, and decreases as the variability of the earnings increases. 
Thus, there is a tradeoff between the Z-index and the bank’s probability of failure (Ber-
ger et al., 2009: 106). The Z-index increases with higher profitability and capitalization 
levels, and decreases with unstable earnings that are reflected by a higher standard de-
viation of return on assets. In other words, it can be regarded as an inverse proxy of the 
bank’s risk-taking.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The period 1999-2001 can be considered years of transformation for Turkish banks. 
Within these three years, the Turkish economy was hit by two severe economic crises and 
a destructive earthquake in the most industrialized region of the country. Furthermore, the 
parliament approved the new banking law (no 4389) in 1999. The Government guarantee 
on deposits, which had been set at 100 % for the year 1994 was restricted to 100,000 Tur-
kish liras in 2000 and was further restricted to 50,000 Turkish liras in 2001. 
The Turkish Banking Restructuring Program was started in 2001. To build a stronger 
banking system after the two severe crises, this program was conducted under the con-
trol of the IMF. The aim of these actions was to create a more efficient banking system. 
However, the restructuring program has turned out to be one of the most costly restructu-
ring programs in the world (Banks in Turkey, 2001).
In Turkey, there were 81 banks operating in 1999. Over the next decade this num-
ber fell drastically and as of April 2010 there are only 45 banks operating in Turkey. Of 
these, 32 are deposit banks and 13 are development and investment banks. Of the deposit 
banks, 3 are state-owned banks, 11 are privately-owned, 11 are foreign banks founded in 
Turkey, 6 are foreign banks having branches in Turkey, and there is one Saving and De-
posit Insurance Fund3. 
3 SDIF is a state institution that insures saving deposits and participation funds and resolves the banks and assets 
transferred to it in a proper way. 
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Banking has a distinctive place in the Turkish financial system and plays an impor-
tant role in achieving financial stability in Turkey.4 Although there has been a recent in-
crease in the number and size of non-banking financial institutions, the system is still do-
minated by the deposit banks. 
Data was drawn from the banks’ balance sheets and income statements as reported 
to the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) and covers 30 deposit banks operating during 
the 2001-2009 period5, and the IPI data were obtained from the Turkish Central Bank 
(TCMB). As a measure of loan risk, the non-performing loans ratio (gross) and as a me-
asure of overall bank risk Z-index are used. Table A3 gives the definitions and summary 
statistics of the variables employed in the empirical part of the study. The summary stati-
stics show that our sample consists of very heterogeneous observations. 
Two variables are employed in the study as proxies for market power. First, the Ler-
ner index is derived from the marginal cost function and the price of the bank’s produc-
tion as explained in methodology section. Second, (MP) is calculated as the differen-
ce between the total revenue and total cost divided by the total revenue. Higher values 
of market power correspond to lower competition levels. Thus a negative coefficient is 
expected according to the competition-fragility view. On the other hand, the competition-
stability view expects a positive relation. The ASSETSHARE variable measures the asset 
share of the individual bank in the sector. Total shareholders’ equity divided by the total 
assets (EA) is the indicator of capital adequacy. Net profits (losses) divided by the total 
assets (NPA) is employed to control the effect of profitability on risk variables. Total re-
venues divided by the total expenses (TRTE) variable is employed to control for mana-
gerial efficiency. 
In this study, the industrial production index (IPI) is used to control for the changes 
in the economic environment. When IPI is increasing, borrowers (firms and consumers) 
are considered to be earning more and to be able to repay loans more easily, thus the IPI 
has a negative expected relationship for NPLG, and has a positive expected sign for the 
empirical model for which the Z-index is the dependent variable. 
4 Empirical results
The average Lerner index is calculated as 0.9674. This indicator implies that the banks 
in Turkey do not operate in a competitive environment, and enjoy monopoly rents. This 
result is consistent with Abbasoglu et al. (2007) who provide evidences for a monopo-
listic competitive structure in the Turkish banking system from 2001 to 2005. With this 
calculation of market power, it is seen that Turkey has a less competitive banking sector 
than, particularly, the EU economies. In a recent study Carbo et al. (2009) calculate the 
average Lerner index for EU countries as 0.16.
 An interesting result observed from the correlation matrix is the correlation between 
LERNER, MP and ASSETSHARE variables. There is a weak correlation between ASSETS-
4 Total assets of the banking system account for nearly 90 percent of the total assets of the financial sector and 
deposit banks held 97 percent of the total banking system assets in 2008 (Banks Association of Turkey, 2008).
5 See table A2 for the list of banks included in the study. 
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HARE and the LERNER 0.08 and a 0.1 correlation between ASSETSHARE and MP. This 
preliminary result contradicts the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis used in in-
dustrial organization theory. This hypothesis argues that as concentration increases, the 
banking environment becomes less competitive, which results in higher monopoly rents; 
accordingly, competition can be measured by the concentration indices. However, the 
number of studies challenging this hypothesis increased recently (Claessens and Laeven, 
2003; and Abbasoglu et al., 2007). 
Tables A5-A8 summarize the results of the static and dynamic empirical models. 
Under the static models fixed-effects, random-effects and GMM models are estimated. 
The first two techniques assume the market power variable is exogeneous. However mar-
ket power can be endogeneously determined. That is to say market power can also be a 
function of level of risk. The Durbin Wu Hausman test is conducted to test for endoge-
neity. Except for the first group of estimations (table A5) LERNER is found to be exo-
geneously determined. For all the other remaining regressions LERNER and MP are en-
dogeneous. In order to avoid the biased coefficient estimations caused by endogeneity, 
2SLS or GMM techniques are applied in the literature (Berger et al., 2009; and Shaeck 
and Cihak, 2007). However, Baum and Schaffer (2003) indicate that if the errors are he-
teroscedastic, the GMM technique will give more efficient estimates than the 2SLS. In 
order to test for the homoscedasticity assumption the Breusch-Pagan test employed and 
the errors are found to be heterosedastic. Consequently, the GMM technique can be con-
sidered superior to the other static estimation techniques when endogeneity of market 
power proxies is present. 
Under the dynamic models, two specifications of the GMM method proposed by Are-
llano-Bond (1991) are used: in the first, market power variables are exogenously deter-
mined, and endogeneously in the second model. In the models where the market power 
variables are endogenously determined, one-period lagged values of the market power 
variables are used as instruments. However, coefficients of the lagged dependent varia-
bles are insignificant in all specifications in tables A5-A8, which indicate the superiori-
ty of the static models. 
To sum, among the static models, since the market power variables are endogeneo-
us and heteroscedasticity is present, the GMM technique is superior to the other specifi-
cations of tables A6, A7 and A8. For models in table A5, where NPLG is the dependent 
and LERNER is the independent variable, the Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test in-
dicates the absence of endogeneity. Thus random or fixed effects models are superior to 
static GMM. However the Hausman test is indifferent between the random and the fixed 
effects model at 5%. Moreover the results of the fixed and random effects models are 
quite similar. 
Fixed and random effects estimations of table A5 indicate no significant relationship 
between NPLG and LERNER. In contrast to this finding, in table A6 where NPLG is the 
dependent and MP is employed as the independent variable, a positive and statistically 
significant relationship is found in the static GMM specification of the model. Both static 
and dynamic GMM estimations where LERNER is treated endogeneous in table A7 indi-
cate the presence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between LERNER 
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and Z. Since Z can be regarded as an inverse measure of risk, these results suggest that as 
the market power of a bank increases the risk level of that bank increases. Thus, as mar-
ket power decreases, competition creates less risky banks, and following this, the stabili-
ty of the whole system can be realized. However in table A8 the static GMM model fails 
to find a significant relationship between MP and Z. 
The positive and significant coefficient estimates of EA in random and fixed effects 
models of table A5 and in the static GMM model of table A6 reveal the effect of capita-
lization for risk levels of banks. As shareholder equity to total assets ratio grows banks 
become more likely to take excessive risk. This may be due to offsetting risk by higher 
capitalization levels. 
The negative and significant (10%) coefficient estimates of NPA in the random ef-
fects model of table A5 and the static GMM model of table A6 reveals that as profitabi-
lity increases banks are less likely to have higher loan risk levels. However this finding 
should not be considered very important since the fixed effects estimate of the coeffici-
ent in table A5 is insignificant. 
As for the effects of ownership structure on loan and overall risk levels of banks, the 
three state-owned banks are found to be more likely to have higher risk levels than pri-
vate banks in all superior specifications of tables A5-A8. As for the effect of the foreign 
ownership, foreign banks are found less risky in the models of table A5, A6 and A7. Fi-
nally, the IPI variable has no explanatory power in any of the models, which indicates loan 
and overall risk levels of banks are not affected by the macro economic conditions. 
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine the relationship between the market power and 
risk-taking behaviors of banks in Turkey between 2001 and 2009. As dependent variables, 
non-performing loans and Z-index are employed as measures of loan and overall risk le-
vels respectively, and the market power is first measured by the Lerner index. However, 
calculation of the Lerner index can be subject to many misspecification biases in ban-
king. Thus secondly, in addition to the standard Lerner index, the difference between the 
total revenues and total cost over the total revenues (which does not specify any restricti-
on on inputs and outputs or a cost function to estimate the marginal cost) is used as anot-
her proxy for the market power.
Employing both static and dynamic panel data estimation techniques, some eviden-
ce supporting the competition-stability hypothesis is found in the empirical part. Howe-
ver the findings of the study indicate that the effect of the market power on the risk-ta-
king behaviors of banks is not crystal clear in Turkey after the year 2000. Another fin-
ding is related to the negative relationship between profitability and fragility. This finding 
suggests that a fall in profitability – measured by the ratio of net profit (loss) to assets – 
leads to increases in loan risk levels of banks. Capitalization measured by the sharehol-
ders’ equity divided by the total assets plays a positive role on the risk-taking of banks. 
This can be due to banks’ attempts to offset risk by higher capitalization levels. That is 
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to say, the loan risk and the overall risk levels tend to be higher in better capitalized and 
less profitable banks. 
As a proxy for macroeconomic environment, the industrial production index does not 
have any explanatory power on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in Turkey. Regarding 
the ownership structure and risk taking behaviors of banks, the three state-owned banks 
are found to be more likely to have higher risk levels than private banks. Additionally 
there is some little evidence supporting the idea that the foreign banks are less risky than 
the domestic ones. To sum up, our main result of the competition-stability hypothesis is 
in line with findings of the previous study of Tunay (2009) on Turkish banking. 
Some policy suggestions can be derived from the results of the study. First of all 
there is a huge gap between the average market powers of EU and Turkish banking sy-
stems. Banks in Turkey operate nearly in a non-competitive environment compared to the 
EU economies. In addition to this fact, the disadvantages of having less competition and 
“too big to fail” policies in banking are especially important for an emerging economy 
like Turkey. Thus competition should be fostered in the sector in order to have a system 
composed of less risky banks and a consequent lower probability of financial crisis. The 
current system is composed of powerful banks (with higher price-cost margins), and the 
entrance of smaller banks (lower price-cost margin) should be encouraged. In this way, a 
more competitive banking system can be created and the investment level of the econo-
my might be increased with lower prices on the loan side. 
This paper can be extended by employing the banking crises as fragility indicator, 
moreover other competition measures such as the Panzar and Rosse’s H-stat, the Her-
fihndahl–Hirschmann, and Boone indices can be used to analyze the competitive struc-
ture of Turkish banking.
306
E. Yaldιz and F. Bazzana: The effect of market power on bank risk taking in Turkey
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (3) 297-314 (2010)
APPENDIX
Table A1: Total cost function estimation results Dep. Var.: log(TC)  













Overall significance Wald chi2(8) = 1492.35Prob > chi2 = 0.00
Number of observations 262
Notes: (a) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(b) Output implies the log of total loans. 
(c) Pk, Pl and Pf stand for logs of the prices of capital, labor and funds respectively.  
Table A2: List of banks used in the study
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş.
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. Citibank A.Ş.
Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O. Denizbank A.Ş.
Adabank A.Ş. Deutsche Bank A.Ş.
Akbank T.A.Ş. Eurobank Tekfen A.Ş.
Alternatif Bank A.Ş. Finans Bank A.Ş.
Anadolubank A.Ş. Fortis Bank A.Ş.
Şekerbank T.A.Ş. HSBC Bank A.Ş.
Tekstil Bankası A.Ş. ING Bank A.Ş.
Turkish Bank A.Ş. Millennium Bank A.Ş.
Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş. Turkland Bank A.Ş.
Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş. Bank Mellat
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. Société Générale (SA)
Birleşik Fon Bankası A.Ş. WestLB AG
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Table A3: Summary statistics 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
Nplg Loans under follow-up (gross) / Total loans (%) 265 35.62 241.6 0 3759
Z (NPA+ EA) / std. dev(NPA) 270 2.78 2.59 -3.06 15.07
Lerner Lerner index (Price-Marginal Cost) / Price 262 0.9674 0.096 0.021 0.995
Mp (Total Revenues-Total Cost) /Total revenues (%) 269 0.9921 0.0025 0.971 0.9992
Assetshare Asset share in the sector (%) 270 3.214 4.78 0.0001 19.4
Npa Net profit (losses) / Total assets (%) 270 0.983 6.84 63.2 32.2
Ea Shareholders’ equity / Total assets (%) 270 18.07 16.36 -2.67 84.9
Trte Total revenues / Total expenses (%) 269 144.2 91.1 34.63 1290.8
Ipi Industrial production index 270 125 17.2 94.43 146.32
Table A4: Correlations 
Nplg Z Lerner Mp Assetshare Npa Ea Trte Ipi
Nplg  1
Z  0.21  1
Lerner -0.25 -0.23  1
Mp -0.06  0.51  0.21 1
Assetshare -0.07 -0.15  0.08 0.1  1
Npa -0.49  0.44  0.26 0.67  0.07  1
Ea  0.49  0.89 -0.39 0.23 -0.21 -0.004 1
Trte  0.17  0.73  0.03 0.57 -0.05  0.52 0.56 1
Ipi -0.009  0.11  0.21 0.16  0.03  0.23 0.01 0.08 1
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Table A5: Estimation results: dep var=nplg and market power=Lerner
Dep var: 








































































































Hausman test chi2(6) = 12.45Prob>chi2 = 0.05
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Wooldridge test for the serial correlation indicates absence of serial correlation. 
Heteroscedasticity robust std. errors are presented in parentheses. 
(a) FE and RE estimators that assume Lerner exogeneous. 
(b) GMM estimators that assumes Lerner endogeneous. 
(c) differenced GMM estimator that assumes all independent variables except the lagged depen-
dent variable are exogeneous.
(d) differenced GMM estimator that assumes Lerner and lagged dependent variable are endoge-
neous.
(e) # denotes the preferred models according to results of Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test, 
Hausman specification test. 
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Table A6: Estimation results: dep var=nplg and market power=MP
Dep var: 














































































obs 264 264 234 205 205
R-squared
within = .43 
between = .89 
overall = .54
within = .42




















Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Wooldridge test for the serial correlation indicates absence of serial correlation. 
Heteroscedasticity robust std. errors are presented in parentheses. 
(a) FE and RE estimators that assume MP exogeneous. 
(b) GMM estimator assume MP endogeneous. 
(c) differenced GMM estimator that assumes all independent variables except the lagged depen-
dent variable are exogeneous.
(d) differenced GMM estimator that assumes MP and lagged dependent variable are endogene-
ous.
(e) # denotes the preferred model according to results of the Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity 
test.
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Table A7: Estimation results: dep var=z and market power=Lerner






























































obs 262 262 229 201 201
R-squared
within = .33 
between = .58 
overall = .48 
within = .32 
between =.79 
overall = .57


















Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Wooldridge test for the serial correlation indicates absence of serial correlation. 
Heteroscedasticity robust std. errors are presented in parentheses. 
(a) FE and RE estimators that assumes Lerner exogeneous. 
(b) GMM estimator that assume Lerner endogeneous. 
(c) differenced GMM estimator that assumes all independent variables except the lagged depen-
dent variable are exogenous.
(d) differenced GMM estimator that assumes Lerner and lagged dependent variable are endoge-
neous.
(e) # denotes the preferred models according to results of Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test.
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Table A8: Estimation results: dep var=z and market power=MP






























































obs 269 269 239 210 210
R-squared
within = .38 
between = .30 
overall = .33
within = .38 
between = .40 
overall = .40
Centered = .43















Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Wooldridge test for the serial correlation indicates absence of serial correlation. 
Heteroscedasticity robust std. errors are presented in parentheses. 
(a) FE and RE estimators that assume MP exogeneous. 
(b) GMM estimators that assumes MP endogeneous. 
(c) differenced GMM estimator that assumes all independent variables except the lagged depen-
dent variable are exogenous.
(d) differenced GMM estimator that assumes MP and lagged dependent variable are endogene-
ous.
(e) # denotes the preferred models according to results of Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test.
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